Trace-based cryptanalysis of cyclotomic $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-PLWE for the non-split case

Iván Blanco-Chacón, Raúl Durán-Díaz, Rahinatou Yuh Njah Nchiwo and Beatriz Barbero-Lucas

Abstract. We describe a decisional attack against a version of the PLWE problem in which the samples are taken from a certain proper subring of large dimension of the cyclotomic ring $\mathbb{F}_q[x]/(\Phi_p^k(x))$ with $k > 1$ in the case where $q \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ but $\Phi_p^k(x)$ is not totally split over $\mathbb{F}_q$. Our attack uses the fact that the roots of $\Phi_p^k(x)$ over suitable extensions of $\mathbb{F}_q$ have zero-trace and has overwhelming success probability as a function of the number of input samples. An implementation in Maple and some examples of our attack are also provided.

1 Introduction

One of the features which makes lattice-based cryptography so attractive is the fact that the security of its schemes is based on worst-case versions of classical lattice problems, like the $\gamma$-approximate Shortest Vector problem (SVP). If $S$ is one of such schemes, breaking $S$ implies that one can solve any instance of that problem with essentially the same complexity as that with which the scheme is broken. This property can be rephrased...
by stating that the $\gamma$-SVP reduces to the scheme $\mathcal{S}$ or that $\mathcal{S}$ admits a reduction from the $\gamma$-SVP.

The first scheme based on the worst-case $\gamma$-SVP (for $\gamma(n) = n^c$, fixed $c > 0$, and an $n$-dimensional lattice) dates back to 1996 and is due to Ajtai ([1]). This scheme and subsequent refinements by Dwork, Cai, Nerurkar, Goldreich, Goldwasser, Halevi and Micciancio (to cite only a few) deal with one-way functions and specially with the difficult issue of collision resistance. But it was not until 2005, with Regev’s pioneering work [12], that lattice-based methods reshaped the landscape of public key cryptography, notably with the arising interest towards post-quantum cryptography. Regev’s scheme is based upon the so-called Learning With Errors Problem (LWE), which roughly speaking consists in guessing a secret vector $s \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ if an adversary is given access to an arbitrary number of pairs $(a_i, \langle a_i, s \rangle + e_i) \in \mathbb{F}_q \times \mathbb{F}_q$ where $e_i \in \mathbb{F}_q$ are randomly sampled from a discrete version of a Gaussian distribution with small enough (but not too small) variance. As Regev proves, this problems admits a reduction from the worst-case $\gamma$-SVP in quantum polynomial time for $\gamma(n) = \mathcal{O}(n)$, which though it is not known to be NP-hard, is reasonably not too far from a version which indeed is proved to be so, namely, the same problem but for $\gamma = \mathcal{O}(1)$ (see [11]).

Unfortunately, Regev’s cryptosystem is not practical for implementations and deployment on average to large volumes of data, since the correction of the scheme requires key sizes of order $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$. This drawback led Stehlé to introduce the Polynomial Learning With Errors (PLWE, see [16]) problem and cryptosystem and later on, to Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev to introduce the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE, see [10]) problem, a version of LWE where the public and secret keys are taken from a ring (a quotient polynomial ring in the PLWE case or a quotient of the ring of integers of a number field for RLWE), rather than from the sheer vector space $\mathbb{F}_q^n$.

Each of these two problems has its own virtues and drawbacks. Security reduction proofs have been given for RLWE: in [10], the authors give a reduction from the $\gamma$-SVP to the decisional version of RLWE (for cyclotomic number fields, although in [13] the cyclotomic condition is replaced by the far more general condition for the underlying number field to be Galoisian). However, PLWE is more suitable for efficient implementations thanks to very fast multiplication algorithms like Toom, Karatsuba or versions of the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) which are not available for number fields, where just finding integral bases becomes cumbersome even for moderately large degree and discriminant (let alone those of cryptographic size). Luckily, in a good number of interesting cases both problems are equivalent (see [2, 3, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15]).

The first attacks on chosen parameters for the PLWE problem are presented in [9] and [8] and they are valid if $f(x)$ has a root $\rho \in \mathbb{F}_q$ such that either (i) $\rho = 1$, or (ii) the multiplicative order of $\rho$ is small, or (iii) the representative of $\rho$ between 0 and $q - 1$ is also small (say, $\rho = 2$ or 3). If $d$ is the smallest positive integer such that $q^d \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, it is a well-known fact that the $n$-th cyclotomic polynomial splits into $\phi(n)/d$ irreducible degree $d$ factors over $\mathbb{F}_q[x]$, whose roots have maximal order $n$ in the multiplicative group $\mathbb{F}_q^\times$. When $d = 1$, such polynomial splits totally in $\mathbb{F}_q$ in which case it has precisely $\phi(n)$
roots of maximal order $n$ and hence these attacks do not apply to the cases (i) and (ii).

In [4], the authors present an attack against PLWE in the case where $f(x)$ has a quadratic irreducible factor over $\mathbb{F}_q[x]$ of the form $x^2 + \rho$, where either $\rho = 1$ or the multiplicative order of $-\rho$ determines a smallness region $\Sigma$ (see Section 2 for details) such that $|\Sigma| < q$. Apart from the order, the cardinality of $\Sigma$ depends on the degree of the polynomial modulus as well as on the noise parameter and the success of our attack just depends on (i) the feasibility of constructing $\Sigma$, (ii) the fact that $|\Sigma|$ is upper bounded by $q$, and (iii) the fact that the main loop in our algorithm can be performed with complexity $O(\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)}q)$ where $n = p^k$.

The present communication deals with the case where $f(x) = \Phi_{p^k}(x)$ and $q = 1 + p^2u$ with $u$ coprime to $p$. In this case (see Section 2), $f(x)$ decomposes into $p(p-1)$ irreducible factors on $\mathbb{F}_q[x]$, each of degree $p^{k-2}$ and each of these has a root over $\mathbb{F}_{q^{p^k-2}}$ of trace zero. Leaving aside the splitting case and the case where $\Phi_{p^k}(x)$ remains irreducible over $\mathbb{F}_q$, this work and [4] can somehow be considered as extreme cases: here the irreducible factors have maximal degree (namely, $p^{k-2} \neq 0$) whereas in [4] the degree is minimal (namely, 2).

In both works, we exploit the existence of the zero-trace root to produce a very effective decisional attack against a variant of the PLWE problem, in which the samples $(a(x), b(x))$ belong to $R_{q,0} \times R_q$, where $R_{q,0}$ is a subring of $R_q$ that, as $\mathbb{F}_q$-subspace, has either dimension $n - 1$ (in [4]), or dimension $p^{n-1}(p-1) - p^{n-2} + 1$ (in this work). It is the maximality of this dimension what allowed us to reduce the PLWE to its $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-version in probabilistic polynomial time in [4] though, unfortunately, the reduction is still unclear for the present case.

As we discuss at the end of Section 3, the reduction would still be possible in the hypothetical case that a surjective ring homomorphism existed from $R_q$ to $R_{q,0}$ so that small residues were taken to small residues. But the existence of this morphism is currently uncertain and left as an open problem.

The present work is organised as follows: in Section 2 we recall the definitions of the RLWE and PLWE and review in a very sketchy way (with due references provided) how and in which sense these problems admit reductions from supposedly hard problems dealing with ideal lattices. We also recall several properties on the factoring of cyclotomic polynomials in the prime power conductor case since they will be applied in our attack. The first subsection of Section 3 recalls the attacks for $\theta = 1$ and $\theta$ of small order in [9] and [8] and discusses their limitations in the polynomial setting. The second subsection introduces our attack on the $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-PLWE problem and gives a detailed proof of its complexity. Even if the proof of the success of our attack is essentially the same as the one given in [4], it is repeated here to make the work self-contained. Finally, in Section 4 we provide numerical simulations of our algorithm in Maple and comment on its performance.

Finally, the authors are thankful to the referee for making helpful suggestions which helped to improve the quality of our manuscript.
2 The R/PLWE problems and their relation with ideal lattices

In this section we recall the definition of the Polynomial Learning With Errors problem (PLWE) as well as we explain its relation with two supposedly hard problems about lattices: the shortest vector problem (SVP) and the bounded distance decoding problem (BDD) over ideal lattices.

Though the present work aims at presenting certain types of attacks against PLWE, we will give definitions for both RLWE and PLWE problems for the sake of completeness and because they are intimately connected (actually equivalent in certain suitable settings).

Let us recall first two kinds of random variables that will intervene in our definitions:

Definition 2.1. Given an $\mathbb{F}_q$-vector space $V$ of dimension $d$, we say that a random variable $X$ with values over $V$ is uniform if $P[X = v] = 1/q^d$ for each $v \in V$.

In Section 3 we will need this fact, which has a standard proof:

Lemma 2.2. If $X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_n$ are independent uniform distributions over $\mathbb{F}_q$ then, for each $\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \ldots, \lambda_n \in \mathbb{F}_q$, not all of them zero, the variable $\sum_{i=1}^n \lambda_i X_i$ is also uniform.

Proof. It is clearly sufficient to check that if $X_1$ and $X_2$ are uniform, then $X_1 + X_2$ is also uniform. But for $i \in \mathbb{F}_q$, using the Total Probability Theorem we have

$$P[X_1 + X_2 = i] = \sum_{j \in \mathbb{F}_q} P[X_1 + X_2 = i | X_2 = j] P[X_2 = j]$$

$$= \frac{1}{q} \sum_{j \in \mathbb{F}_q} P[X_1 = i - j] = \frac{1}{q}. \quad \square$$

The second kind of random variable already requires to recall some notions on lattices. Here we are following Section 2 of [10].

Let $n, s_1$ and $s_2$ be either zero or natural numbers with $n = s_1 + 2s_2$. Let us consider the $\mathbb{R}$-vector subspace of $\mathbb{C}^n$ defined as

$$\Lambda_n = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}^{s_1} \times \mathbb{C}^{2s_2} : x_{s_1+i} = \bar{x}_{s_1+s_2+i} \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq s_2\},$$

which, endowed with the induced Hermitian metric in $\mathbb{C}^n$, is a Euclidean space of dimension $n$.

For $r > 0$, the Gaussian function $\rho_r(x) = \exp(-\pi ||x||^2/r^2)$ defines, once normalised, the density function of a Gaussian random variable with null vector of means and covariance matrix $r I_n$, with $I_n$ the $n$-dimensional identity matrix. Moreover, by fixing a basis $\{h_i\}_{i=1}^n$ of $\Lambda_n$ and for a vector $r = (r_1, \ldots, r_n) \in \mathbb{R}_+^n$ such that $r_{s_1+i} = r_{s_1+s_2+i}$ for $1 \leq i \leq s_2$, if $\{\mathcal{N}(0, r_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ is a set of independent 1-dimensional zero-mean Gaussian variables, of variance $r_i^2$, the variable $D_r = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{N}(0, r_i) h_i$ is an elliptic $n$-dimensional zero-mean Gaussian variable whose covariance matrix has the vector $r$ as main diagonal and 0 elsewhere. Denote by $\rho_r(x)$ the density function of $D_r$. 

Trace-based cryptanalysis of cyclotomic $R_{q,0} \times R_{q}$-PLWE for the non-split case

Figure 1: Discrete Gaussian on $\mathbb{Z}^2$ (with permission of Oded Regev)

For us, by a lattice over $\Lambda_n$, we will understand a pair $(\mathcal{L}, \iota)$ where $\mathcal{L}$ is a finitely generated abelian group and $\iota : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \Lambda_n$ is a group monomorphism. We will only deal with full-rank lattices in this communication, i.e., those whose $\mathbb{Z}$-rank is precisely $n$, the ambient space dimension.

If $\mathcal{L}$ is such a full-rank lattice embedded in $\Lambda_n$ and $\{h_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is a $\mathbb{Z}$-basis of $\iota(\mathcal{L})$ and henceforth a basis of $\Lambda_n$ as a vector space, we can define the notion of a Gaussian variable supported on $\mathcal{L}$ as well as its discrete version, a key ingredient for the problems under study:

**Definition 2.3.** A random variable $X$ supported on $\mathcal{L}$ (hence discrete) is called a discrete elliptic Gaussian random variable whenever its probability function is

$$P[X = x] = \frac{\rho_r(x)}{\rho_r(L)} \text{ for } x \in \mathcal{L}.$$ 

Figure 1 shows an example of 2-dimensional discrete Gaussian, where as expected, most of the probability mass is located around the mean vector, the origin in this case.

### 2.1 The $R$-PLWE problems

Here we denote by $K/\mathbb{Q}$ a Galois extension of degree $n$, or equivalently, the splitting field of a monic irreducible polynomial $f(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ of degree $n$, minimal polynomial of, say, $\alpha \in K$. Each automorphism of the Galois group $\text{Gal}(K/\mathbb{Q})$ is hence determined by its value at $\alpha$. Denote these automorphisms by $\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^n$ with $\sigma_1 = I$, the identity, and let us label the roots of $f(x)$ such that $\{\alpha_i\}_{i=1}^{s_1}$ is the set of real roots and $\{\alpha_i\}_{i=s_1+1}^n$ is the set of $s_2$ pairs of complex non-real roots with $\alpha_i = \overline{\alpha_{i+s_2}}$ for $s_1 + 1 \leq i \leq s_1 + s_2$. When $s_1 = 0$ we say that $K$ is totally complex and when $s_2 = 0$ we say that $K$ is totally real.

As usual, the notation $\mathcal{O}_K$ stands for the ring of integers of $K$. We will moreover assume, for the sake of simplicity, that $K$ is monogenic, i.e. that $\mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[\alpha]$ for some $\alpha \in \mathcal{O}_K$. Let us denote $R := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(f(x)) \simeq \mathbb{Z}[\alpha]$ and for a prime $q \in \mathbb{Z}$, let us set $R_q := R/qR \simeq \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(f(x))$. 
Both rings $R$ and $\mathcal{O}_K$ can be endowed with a lattice structure over $\mathbb{R}^n$:

**Definition 2.4** (The coefficient embedding). For the ring $R$, the coefficient embedding is

$$\sigma_{\text{coef}} : R \hookrightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$$

$$\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i\bar{x}^i \mapsto (a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1}),$$

with $\bar{x}^i$ being the class of $x^i$ modulo the principal ideal $(f(x))$.

The ring $\mathcal{O}_K$, as well known, is finitely generated over $\mathbb{Z}$ of rank $n$ and hence admits a lattice structure too:

**Definition 2.5** (The canonical embedding). For the ring $\mathcal{O}_K$, the canonical embedding is

$$\sigma_{\text{can}} : \mathcal{O}_K \hookrightarrow \Lambda_n$$

$$\alpha \mapsto (\sigma_1(\alpha), \ldots, \sigma_n(\alpha)).$$

The lattices $\sigma_{\text{can}}(\mathcal{O}_K)$ and $\sigma_{\text{coef}}(R)$ inherit a multiplicative structure from the product defined on their corresponding domains, which motivates the following definition:

**Definition 2.6** (Ideal lattices). A lattice $\mathcal{L}$ is called an ideal lattice if there exists a ring $R$, an ideal $I \subseteq R$, and an additive group monomorphism $\sigma : R \hookrightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$ such that $\mathcal{L} = \sigma(I)$.

Let now $q \geq 2$ be a prime. If $\chi$ is a discrete Gaussian distribution supported on either $\sigma_{\text{can}}(\mathcal{O}_K)$ or $\sigma_{\text{coef}}(R)$, we can reduce component-wise its outputs modulo $q$. Such a random variable is referred to as a discrete Gaussian modulo $q$.

Let $\chi_K$ be a discrete Gaussian of 0 mean and covariance matrix $\Sigma_K$ supported on the quotient $\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K$ (or, rather, in the $n$-dimensional torus $\mathbb{T}_K = (K \otimes \mathbb{R})/\mathcal{O}_K$) and let $\chi_R$ a discrete Gaussian of 0 mean and covariance matrix $\Sigma_R$, supported on $R_q$ embedded in the torus $\mathbb{T}_R = (R \otimes \mathbb{R})/R$.

**Definition 2.7** (RLWE/PLWE oracles). Given $s \in \mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K$ (resp. $R_q$), an RLWE oracle associated to the triple $(\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K, s, \chi_K)$ (resp. a PLWE oracle attached to the triple $(R_q, s, \chi_R)$) is a probabilistic algorithm $A_{s,\chi_K}$ (resp. $A_{s,\chi_R}$) which runs as follows:

1. Samples an element $a \in \mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K$ (resp. in $R_q$) from a uniform distribution.
2. Samples an element $e \in \mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K$ from $\chi_K$ (resp. in $R_q$ from $\chi_R$).
3. Outputs the element $(a, b = as + e)$.

Setting $(\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K)^2 := (\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K) \times (\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K)$ and $R_q^2 := R_q \times R_q$, the (decision version of) the R/P-LWE problems are defined as follows:

**Definition 2.8** (RLWE/PLWE decision problems). Let $\chi_K$ and $\chi_R$ be as before. The R/P-LWE problem consists in deciding with non-negligible advantage, for a set of samples of arbitrary size $(a_i, b_i) \in (\mathcal{O}_K/q\mathcal{O}_K)^2$ (resp. in $R_q^2$), whether they are sampled from the R/P-LWE oracle or from the uniform distribution.
From now on we will deal with the PLWE problem so that $R$ will be embedded into $\mathbb{R}^n$ via the coefficient embedding and so that our discrete Gaussians will be supported on the quotient ring $R_q$.

### 2.2 Lattice related problems.

As we pointed out in the introduction, the problems LWE, RLWE, (and PLWE whenever its equivalent to RLWE) admit quantum polynomial time reductions from several versions of the SVP, which we recall next:

**Definition 2.9** (The $\gamma$-SVP). Let $\gamma : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ be a function. Given a full-rank lattice $\Lambda$ of rank $n$, together with a $\mathbb{Z}$-basis of $\Lambda$, the $\gamma$-Shortest Vector Problem consists in returning an element $v \in \Lambda \setminus \{0\}$ such that

$$||v||_2 \leq \gamma(n)\lambda_1(\Lambda),$$

where $\lambda_1(\Lambda) = \min_{x \in \Lambda \setminus \{0\}} ||x||_2$ and $|| \cdot ||_2$ denotes the Euclidean norm on $\mathbb{R}^n$ (although the problem admits, obviously, a version with respect with any $l_p$ norm).

In [11], the author proves that the $\gamma$-SVP is NP hard for $\gamma(n) \leq \sqrt{2}$ and $n \geq 1$. As already mentioned in the introduction, the author of [12] proves that there exists a quantum polynomial time algorithm $R$ with complexity $\mathcal{O}(p(n))$ for certain polynomial $p(x)$ that gives a reduction from the worst-case $\gamma$-SVP with $\gamma(n) = \mathcal{O}(n)$ to the LWE problem. This means that if an adversary $A$ existed that were able to solve LWE with non-negligible advantage with complexity $\mathcal{O}(f(n))$, then this adversary could be turned into an adversary $R(A)$ able to solve $\gamma$-SVP with complexity $\mathcal{O}(f(n)p(n))$, also with non-negligible advantage.

As for RLWE, [10] shows the existence of a quantum polynomial time algorithm $R$ with complexity $\mathcal{O}(p(n))$ that gives a reduction from the worst-case $\gamma$-SVP for ideal lattices to the RLWE problem in decisional version. The $\gamma$-SVP for ideal lattices is the restriction of $\gamma$-SVP to the class of ideal lattices $(I, \sigma_{can})$ where $I$ is an ideal of the ring of integers of a cyclotomic field (see next subsection) and $\sigma_{can}$ is the canonical embedding. In [13], the authors elaborate on the same ideas and generalise the class of ideal lattices for which the reduction exists to those corresponding to rings of integers of Galois number fields.

It is convenient to point out that the NP-hardness of SVP is established to uniformly bounded functions $\gamma$, hence it is not clear that LWE is NP-hard, even if empirical evidence strongly suggests that it is an intractable problem. Unfortunately, for RLWE the situation is even weaker, since it is not even known whether $\gamma$-SVP is NP-hard for ideal lattices for uniformly bounded $\gamma$, which is currently an active research area.

### 2.3 The cyclotomic polynomial and its splitting behaviour over finite fields

We will denote $K_n := \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_n)$, the $n$-th cyclotomic field (where $\zeta_n$ denotes a primitive complex $n$-root of unity). It is well known that $K_n$ is the splitting field of the $n$-th cyclotomic polynomial, which we will denote by $\Phi_n(x)$. In particular, $K_n/\mathbb{Q}$ is a Galois
extension of degree \( m := \phi(n) \), where \( \phi \) stands for the Euler’s totient function. It is also well known that \( K_n \) is monogenic, in particular \( \mathcal{O}_K = \mathbb{Z}[\zeta_n] \).

When \( q \equiv 1 \pmod{n} \), the prime \( q \) is totally split in \( \mathcal{O}_K \) and hence \( \Phi_n(x) \) has \( m \) different roots in \( \mathbb{F}_q \), all of them of maximal multiplicative order \( n \). We will deal, however, with the non-totally split case and moreover, we will suppose that \( n = p^k \) for a prime \( p \). The following result addresses the factorisation of \( \Phi_n(x) \) into irreducible factors in \( \mathbb{F}_q[x] \):

**Theorem 2.10** ([17]). Let \( q = 1 + p^A u \), with \( A \geq 1 \), and \( p, q \) primes. Suppose that \( (u, p) = 1 \) and denote by \( \Omega(p^A) \) the group of primitive \( p^A \)-th roots of unity in \( \mathbb{F}_q \). Assume \( n > A \). Then, we have:

\[
\Phi_{p^n}(x) = \prod_{\rho \in \Omega(p^A)} \left( x^{p^n-A} - \rho \right),
\]

where the polynomials \( x^{p^n-A} - \rho \) are irreducible over \( \mathbb{F}_q \).

We have the following straightforward consequence which will be useful later on:

**Corollary 2.11.** Notations as in Theorem 2.10, for every \( v \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( (v, p) = 1 \), for each \( \rho \in \Omega(p^A) \) and for each \( 0 \leq k < n - A \), the polynomial \( x^{p^n-k-A} - \rho^v \) is irreducible over \( \mathbb{F}_q[x] \).

**Proof.** First, notice that \( \rho^v \) is also a primitive \( p^A \)-th root of unity, hence if we could express \( x^{p^n-k-A} - \rho^v = f(x)g(x) \) with \( \deg(f(x)), \deg(g(x)) \geq 1 \), it would follow that \( x^{p^n-A} - \rho = f(x^p)g(x^p) \), a contradiction. \( \square \)

### 2.4 Fast evaluation of polynomials over finite fields

One of the issues we must confront is to evaluate polynomial expressions over a finite field at elements of certain extensions, in the most efficient possible manner. In particular, for cyclotomic prime conductors of almost-cryptographic size, the well-known Horner’s algorithm might easily become inefficient. The method that we will use, due to Elia, Rosenthal and Schipani, is called automorphic evaluation drastically reduces the number of \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-products by a square root factor.

**Theorem 2.12** ([7, Theorem 3]). The minimum number of \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-products required to evaluate a polynomial of degree \( n \) with coefficients in \( \mathbb{F}_q^s \) at an element of \( \mathbb{F}_q^{m} \) with \( m \geq s \), is upper bounded by

\[
2s(\sqrt{n(q-1)} + 1/2).
\]

### 3 An attack based on traces over finite extensions of \( \mathbb{F}_q \)

One of the first attacks on PLWE (and on RLWE whenever they are equivalent), is that described in [9] and [8], which for a quotient ring \( R_q = \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(f(x)) \) and a prime \( q \), are applicable and successful whenever it exists a simple root \( \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q \) such that
a) $\alpha = 1$, or

b) $\alpha$ has small order modulo $q$, or

c) $\alpha$ has small residue modulo $q$.

By small order the authors understand orders of up to 5, while by small residue, they mean $\alpha = 2$ or $\alpha = 3$ (modulo $q$).

Using the Chinese remainder theorem, we express

$$R_q \simeq \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(x - \alpha) \times \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(h(x)),$$

where $h(x)$ is coprime to $x - \alpha$. We obtain hence a ring homomorphism

$$\psi_\alpha : R_q \to \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(x - \alpha) \simeq \mathbb{F}_q,$$

which is nothing else than the evaluation-at-$\alpha$ map, namely, $\psi_\alpha(g(x)) = g(\alpha)$, for each $g(x) \in R_q$.

Let $n$ be the degree of $f(x)$. Next, we describe two of the three attacks presented in [9], namely, those corresponding to the cases a) and b) above. Let us suppose, to start with, that $\alpha = 1$ is a root of $f(x)$. For a PLWE sample $(a(x), b(x) = a(x)s(x) + e(x))$, the error term, $e(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i x^i$, has its coefficients $e_i \in \mathbb{F}_q$ sampled from a discrete Gaussian with small enough standard deviation $\sigma$ (the authors set $\sigma \approx 8$, as suggested by applications). For an element $s \in \mathbb{F}_q$, writing $s = s(1)$ and applying the evaluation map, we have

$$b(1) - a(1)s = e(1) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i,$$

and the sum $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} e_i$ is hence sampled from a discrete Gaussian variable of standard deviation $\sqrt{n}\sigma$, which according to practical specifications, is of order $O(q^{1/4})$.

For a right guess $s = s(1)$, the value $b(1) - a(1)s$ will belong to the set of integers $[-2\sqrt{n}\sigma, 2\sqrt{n}\sigma] \cap \mathbb{Z}$ (which can be easily enumerated) with probability about 0.95. Hence, we will refer to the set $[-2\sqrt{n}\sigma, 2\sqrt{n}\sigma] \cap \mathbb{Z}$ as the smallness region for this attack.

Case b) is more subtle. Indeed, let $r$ denote the multiplicative order of a root $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_q$, such that $\alpha \neq 1$. Given a PLWE sample $(a(x), b(x) = a(x)s(x) + e(x))$, for $s = s(\alpha) \in \mathbb{F}_q$, we have

$$b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s = e(\alpha) = \sum_{i=0}^{n/r-1} \sum_{i=0}^{r-1} e_{ir+j} \alpha^j,$$

assuming without loss of generality that $r \mid n$.

The elements $e_j = \sum_{i=0}^{n/r-1} e_{ir+j}$ can be regarded as sampled from a Gaussian distribution of 0 mean and standard deviation $\sqrt{n/r}\sigma$, and thus they belong to the set of integers $[-2\sqrt{n/r}\sigma, 2\sqrt{n/r}\sigma] \cap \mathbb{Z}$ with probability 0.95. This leads us to consider in this case the
Input: A collection of samples $C = \{(a_i(x), b_i(x))\}_{i=1}^{M} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_q^2$
A look-up table $\Sigma$ of all possible values for $e(\alpha)$
Output: A guess $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$ for $s(\alpha)$,
or NOT PLWE,
or NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES

- set $S := \mathbb{F}_q$
- set $G := \emptyset$
- for $g \in S$ do
  - for $(a_i(x), b_i(x)) \in C$ do
    * if $b_i(\alpha) - a_i(\alpha)g \notin \Sigma$ then
      · next $g$
    - set $G := G \cup \{g\}$
- if $G = \emptyset$ then return NOT PLWE
- if $G = \{g\}$ then return $g$
- if $|G| > 1$ then return NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES

Algorithm 2: Algorithm solving PLWE decision problem

smallness region as the set $\Sigma$ of all possible values for $e(\alpha)$, which can be precomputed and stored in a look-up table. Notice that

$$|\Sigma| \leq \left(4\sqrt{n/r}\sigma + 1\right)^r.$$

In [8], these ideas are presented and converted into Algorithm 2, whose probability of success is also derived therein:

**Proposition 3.1 ([8, Proposition 3.1]).** Assume $|\Sigma| < q$. If Algorithm 2 returns NOT PLWE, then the samples come from the uniform distribution. If it outputs anything other than NOT PLWE, then the samples are valid PLWE samples with probability given by $1 - (|\Sigma|/q)^M$. In particular, this probability tends to 1 as $M$ grows.

**Remark 3.2.** Notice that the cyclotomic polynomial $\Phi_n(x)$ is protected against these attacks. Indeed, $\alpha = 1$ is never a root modulo $q \neq p$. Moreover, for $q \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ the order of each of the $m$ different roots of $\Phi_n(x)$ is precisely $n$. 
3.1 Our method. Preliminary facts

In this section we present an attack against a variant of the PLWE problem for $\Phi_m(x)$ and for non totally-split primes $q$ by using roots of $\Phi_m(x)$ over finite degree extensions of $\mathbb{F}_q$. To brief notation, let $m := p^n$, $N = \phi(m)$ and $R_q := \mathbb{F}_q[x] / (\Phi_m(x))$. We will assume, as in Theorem 2.10, that $q = 1 + p^A u$, with $A \geq 1$, $(u, p) = 1$ and that $n > A$.

Our attack starts with a primitive $p^A$-th root $\rho$ of unity modulo $q$, for which we take $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-A}} \setminus \mathbb{F}_q$, a $p^{n-A}$-th root of $\rho$. Due to Theorem 2.10 we have $Tr(\alpha) = 0$, where $Tr$ stands for the trace of $\mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-A}}$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$.

Now, if $(a(x), b(x) = a(x)s(x) + e(x)) \in R_q^2$ is a PLWE sample attached to a secret $s(x)$ and an error term $e(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} e_i x^i$, then

$$b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s = e(\alpha),$$

with $s := s(\alpha) \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-A}}$ and

$$Tr(b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s) = Tr(e(\alpha)) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} e_i t_i, \quad (1)$$

where $t_i = Tr(\alpha^i)$.

If $(i, p) = 1$ then $t_i = 0$ since $\alpha$ is a root of $x^{p^n-A} - \rho$ and $ord(\alpha^j) = ord(\alpha) = m$. More in general, we will make use of the following

**Lemma 3.3.** Notations as before, for $i = p^k v$ with $(v, p) = 1$ and $0 \leq k < n - A$, then $t_i = 0$.

**Proof.** For $i = p^k v$ with $(v, p) = 1$ and $0 \leq k < n - A$, the element $\alpha^{p^k v}$ is a root of the polynomial $x^{p^n-k-A} - \rho^v$ and since $\rho^v$ is also a primitive $p^A$-th root of unity, this polynomial is irreducible according to Corollary 2.11. Hence $Tr(\alpha^{p^k v}) = 0$. \hfill $\Box$

Applying Lemma 3.3 to the right hand side of Equation 1 we are left with

$$Tr(b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s) = p^{n-A} \sum_{j=0}^{p^{A-1}(p-1)-1} e_{j p^n-A} \rho^j. \quad (2)$$

But, again, the coefficients $e_{j p^n-A}$ are sampled from a discrete Gaussian $N(0, \sigma^2)$ and we can list those elements which occur with probability beyond 0.95, namely, the integer values in the interval $[-2\sigma, 2\sigma]$.

From now on we will suppose that $A = 2$ and $\sigma = 8$ so that in $[-2\sigma, 2\sigma]$ there are 32 integers. We can construct a look-up table where the expression 2 takes on values with large probability, namely, the smallness region, $\Sigma$. Observe that

$$|\Sigma| \leq (4\sigma + 1)^{2(p-1)}. \quad (3)$$

To construct $\Sigma$ requires $32^{p(p-1)}$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_q$, which is feasible for not very large values of $p$. 


3.2 The trace map

In order to compute the trace of an element \( \theta \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \), we can proceed by fixing an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-basis of \( \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \). For instance, we will stick to the power-basis \( \{1, \alpha, \ldots, \alpha^{p^n-2-1}\} \). Now we identify \( \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \cong \mathbb{F}_q \) and we can write

\[
\theta = \sum_{i=0}^{p^n-2-1} a_i \alpha^i,
\]

where \( a_i \in \mathbb{F}_q \) and \( \alpha^{p^n-2} = \rho \), our chosen \( p^2 \)-th root of unity in \( \mathbb{F}_q \). Taking trace, which is an \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-linear map, we have, as explained in Subsection 3.1:

\[
Tr(\theta) = \sum_{i=0}^{p^n-2-1} a_i Tr(\alpha^i) = p^{n-2} a_0. \tag{4}
\]

A first tentative approach to exploit a root \( \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \) for an attack would be to run over the elements \( s \) in this field as putative guesses for \( s(\alpha) \) and to decide for each sample \((a(x), b(x)) \in R_q^2\) whether \( Tr(b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s) \) belongs or not to the smallness region \( \Sigma \). One would need to evaluate \( Tr(b(\alpha)) \) and \( Tr(a(\alpha)s) \) for each \( s \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \). Leaving aside that running through all the elements of this large field is definitely unfeasible, we can evaluate \( Tr(b(\alpha)) \), which is independent of \( s \), by applying Lemma 3.3:

\[
Tr(b(\alpha)) = p^{n-2} \sum_{j=0}^{p(p-1)-1} b_{j^{p^{n-2}}} \rho^j.
\]

Hence, evaluating \( Tr(b(\alpha)) \) takes about \( 2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} \) \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-products.

As for \( Tr(a(\alpha)s) \), notice that the map \( s \mapsto T_{a(\alpha)}(s) := Tr(a(\alpha)s) \) is also \( \mathbb{F}_q \)-linear, hence identifying \( s \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^n-2}} \) with its coordinates \((s_0, s_1, \ldots, s_{p^n-2-1})\), we can write:

\[
T_{a(\alpha)}(s) = Tr \left( \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} a_i \alpha^i \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-2-1} s_j \alpha^j \right). \tag{5}
\]

Since \( 0 \leq i \leq N-1 \) and \( 0 \leq j \leq p^n-2-1 \), the terms for which the trace do not vanish are those of the form \( a_i x_j \alpha^{i+j} \) with \( i + j = vp^n-2 \), with \( 0 \leq v \leq p(p-1) \). Namely:

\[
T_{a(\alpha)}(s) = p^{n-2} a_0 s_0 + p^{n-2} \sum_{v=1}^{p(p-1)} \left( \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-2-1} s_j a_{vp^n-2-j} \right) \rho^v. \tag{6}
\]

Since for each \( 0 \leq j \leq p^n-2-1 \) we have to evaluate a polynomial of degree \( p(p-1) \) over \( \mathbb{F}_q \), which takes about \( 2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} \), evaluating \( Tr(a(\alpha)s) \) takes \( 2p^{n-2} \sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} \) per sample. However, as we can see, the expression for the trace in Equation 6 is rather complicated and computationally far from optimal, specially if we have to perform it for each sample and for each guess. For this reason, our attack is restricted to samples \((a(x), b(x)) \in R_q^2\) whose left component belong to a subring \( R_q^0 \) which has large dimension.
3.3 A distinguished subspace

Instead of in $R_q^2$, we consider samples in $R_{q,0} \times R_q$ where

$$ R_{q,0} = \{ p(x) \in R_q : p(\alpha) \in \mathbb{F}_q \}. $$

**Proposition 3.4.** The set $R_{q,0}$ is a subring of $R_q$ and an $\mathbb{F}_q$-vector subspace of $R_q$ of dimension $p^{n-1}(p-1) - p^{n-2} + 1$.

**Proof.** It is obvious that $R_{q,0}$ is an $\mathbb{F}_q$-vector subspace and a subring of $R_q$. As for the dimension, notice that for $p(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} p_i x^i$, we have, by dividing each index $i$ by $p^{n-2}$:

$$ p(\alpha) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^{n-2}-1} \left( \sum_{\nu=0}^{(p-1)-1} p_{\nu p^{n-2}+j} \alpha^\nu \right) \alpha^j, $$

hence $p(\alpha) \in \mathbb{F}_q$ if and only if $\sum_{\nu=0}^{(p-1)-1} x_{\nu p^{n-2}+j} \alpha^\nu = 0$ for each $0 < j \leq p^{n-2} - 1$. These are $p^{n-2} - 1$ linearly independent equations, hence the result follows. \hfill \Box

**Remark 3.5.** Observe that, for $a(x) \in R_{q,0}$, it holds that

$$ Tr(a(\alpha)s) = a(\alpha)Tr(s) = p^{n-2}a(\alpha)s_0, $$

which requires only two $\mathbb{F}_q$-multiplications to compute.

3.4 An attack on $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-PLWE

Denote $S := \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^{n-2}-2}}$ and assume that we are given a set of samples from $R_{q,0} \times R_q$. The goal is to distinguish whether these samples come from the $R_{q,0}$-PLWE distribution or from a uniform distribution with values in $R_{q,0} \times R_q$. To that end, given a sample $(a_i(x), b_i(x))$, we pick a guess $s \in S$ for $s(\alpha)$ and check whether $e_i := \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b_i(\alpha) - a_i(\alpha)s)$ belongs to the look-up table $\Sigma$. If this is not the case, we can safely remove from $S$ not only $s$, but also all the elements $t \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{p^{n-2}-2}}$ with the same trace as $s$. But notice that if $s = \sum_{j=0}^{p^{n-2}-1} t_j \alpha^j$, then an element $t = \sum_{j=0}^{p^{n-2}-1} t_j \alpha^j$ has the same trace as $s$ if and only if $t_0 = s_0$. Hence, given an $s \in S$, if we find a sample $(a_i(x), b_i(x))$ for which $e_i \notin \Sigma$, then we can delete $q^{p^{n-2}-1}$ elements of $S$. Since $a(\alpha) \in \mathbb{F}_q$, then

$$ \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)s) = \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha)) - \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} a(\alpha)Tr(s). $$

Therefore, it is enough just to check, for each $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$ (so that $g$ is a putative value for $Tr(s)$), whether or not

$$ \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha)) - \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} a(\alpha)g \in \Sigma. $$
Input: A set of samples $C = \{(a_i(x), b_i(x))\}_{i=1}^{M} \in R_{q,0} \times R_q$
A look-up table $\Sigma$ of all possible values for $Tr(e(\alpha))$

Output: PLWE, or NOT PLWE, or NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES

- set $G := \emptyset$
- for $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$ do
  - for $(a_i(x), b_i(x)) \in C$ do
    * if $\frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha)) - a(\alpha)g \notin \Sigma$ then
      · next $g$
  - set $G := G \cup \{g\}$
- if $G = \emptyset$ then return NOT PLWE
- if $|G| = 1$ then return PLWE
- if $|G| > 1$ then return NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES

Algorithm 3: Decision attack against $R_{q,0}$-PLWE

This is at the price that if the algorithm returns just an element $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$, we should understand that this element is just the trace of one of the $q^{p^{n-2}-1}$ possible guesses for $s(\alpha)$. However, this is (even if weaker than Algorithm 2) enough as a decision attack.

Observe that if $|G| = 1$, say $G = \{g\}$, unlike Algorithm 2, our Algorithm 3 does not output a guess for $s(\alpha)$; all we can only suspect is that there likely exists $\tilde{s} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^{n-2}}$ such that $Tr(\tilde{s}) = g$ with $s(\alpha) = \tilde{s}$.

Next, we evaluate the complexity of our attack in terms of $\mathbb{F}_q$-multiplications:

**Proposition 3.6.** Given $M$ samples in $R_{q,0} \times R_q$, the number of $\mathbb{F}_q$-multiplications required for Algorithm 3 is, at worst, of order $O((\sqrt{p(p-1)}(q-1)Mq))$.

**Proof.** To begin with, given $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$:

- For each sample $(a_i(x), b_i(x))$, evaluating $Tr(b_i(\alpha))$, by automorphic evaluation requires $2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)}$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_q$. Therefore checking whether the element $\frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha) - a(\alpha)g)$ is in $\Sigma$ requires $2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} + 2$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_q$.
- In the worst case, the condition will fail for all the samples, in which case we will perform $(2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} + 2)M$ multiplications in $\mathbb{F}_q$ for each $g \in \mathbb{F}_q$. 


Since the previous steps must be performed for every \( g \in \mathbb{F}_q \), the number of multiplications for the worst case will be \( (2\sqrt{p(p-1)(q-1)} + 2)Mq \).

To derive the success probability of our attack we will make use of the following:

**Remark 3.7.** Given an input sample \((a(x), b(x))\) \(\in R_{q,0} \times R_q\) for Algorithm 3, given \( g \in \mathbb{F}_q \) such that \( a(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1} (p-1-1) a_j x^j \) and \( b(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1} b_j x^j \), one can notice that checking whether \( \frac{1}{p^n-2} Tr(b(\alpha)) - \frac{1}{p^n-2} Tr(a(\alpha))g \in \Sigma \) is exactly the same as checking whether \( b'(\rho) - ga'(\rho) \in \Sigma \) where \( a'(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1} a_{j+p^n-2} x^j \) and \( b'(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1} b_{j+p^n-2} x^j \), with \( a'(x), b'(x) \in R_q' = \mathbb{F}_q[x]/(\Phi_{p^2}(x)) \). Thus, the result of Algorithm 3 on samples \((a_i(x), b_i(x)) \in R_q^2\) is exactly the result of Algorithm 2 applied to the samples \((a'_i(x), b'_i(x)) \) in \((R_q')^2\).

The following result will also be useful in our proof:

**Lemma 3.8.** Let \( \{(a_i(x), b_i(x))\}_{i=1}^M \) be a set of input samples for Algorithm 3, where, as usual, the \( a_i(x) \) are taken uniformly from \( R_{q,0} \) with probability \( q^{-d} \). Then, for the corresponding input samples \((a'_i(x), b'_i(x))\) for Algorithm 2, the elements \( a'_i(x) \) are taken uniformly from \( R_q' \) with probability \( q^{-p(p-1)} \).

**Proof.** For every sample \( a(x) \) taken uniformly from \( R_{q,0} \), if we write, as in Proposition 3.4

\[
a(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1} \left( \sum_{v=0}^{p(p-1)-1} a_{vp^n-2+j} x^{vp^n-2} \right) x^j,
\]

we observe that the polynomial \( a_0(x) = \sum_{v=0}^{p(p-1)-1} a_{vp^n-2} x^{vp^n-2} \) will be sampled from \( R_{q,0} \) with probability \( q^{-d} \) where \( d = p^n-1(p-1) - p^{n-2} + 1 \). But for each \( j \in \{1, \ldots, p^{n-2} - 1\} \) and for each \( p(p-1) \)-tuple

\[
(a_j, a_{p^n-2+j}, \ldots, a_{p(p-1)-1}p^{n-2+j})
\]

such that \( \sum_{v=0}^{p(p-1)-1} a_{vp^n-2+j} \rho^v = 0 \), the polynomial

\[
a_0(x) + \sum_{j=1}^{p^{n-2}-1} \sum_{v=0}^{p(p-1)-1} a_{vp^n-2+j} x^{vp^n-2+j}
\]

is also sampled with probability \( q^{-d} \). These tuples form a vector space of dimension \( p(p-1) - 1 \), hence, there are \( q^{p(p-1)-1} \) of such tuples for every \( j \). Hence, for Algorithm 2, the input sample \( a'(x) = \sum_{v=0}^{p(p-1)-1} a_{vp^n-2} x^v \) (notice that \( a_0(x) = a'(x^{p^n-2}) \)) will occur with probability \( q^{-d}P \), where \( P \) is the number of joint samples for all the \( j' \)'s together, namely \( P = q^{p(p-1)(p^{n-2}-1)} \). Hence, the sample \( a'(x) \) for Algorithm 2 will occur with probability

\[
q^{-d+(p(p-1)-1)(p^{n-2}-1)} = q^{-p(p-1)}.
\]
We can now study the probability of success of our attack:

**Proposition 3.9.** Assume that $|\Sigma| < q$. If Algorithm 3 returns **NOT PLWE**, then the samples come from the uniform distribution on $\mathbb{R}_{q,0} \times \mathbb{R}_q$. If it outputs anything else than **NOT PLWE**, then the samples are valid PLWE samples with probability $1 - (|\Sigma|/q)^M$. In particular, this probability tends to 1 as $M$ grows.

**Proof.** Set input samples $S = \{(a_i(x), b_i(x))\}_{i=1}^M$ and $S' = \{(a'_i(x), b'_i(x))\}_{i=1}^M$, and let us define the following events:

- $E_q = \text{The input samples } S \text{ for Algorithm 3 are uniform},$
- $E'_q = \text{The input samples } S' \text{ for Algorithm 2 are uniform},$
- $rP = \text{Algorithm 3 returns PLWE on input samples } S,$
- $rP' = \text{Algorithm 2 returns PLWE on input samples } S',$
- $rNE = \text{Algorithm 3 returns NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES on input samples } S,$
- $rNE' = \text{Algorithm 2 returns NOT ENOUGH SAMPLES on input samples } S',$
- $rNP = \text{Algorithm 3 returns NOT PLWE on input samples } S,$
- $rNP' = \text{Algorithm 2 returns NOT PLWE on input samples } S'.$

We clearly have $rP \cup rNE \subseteq rP' \cup rNE'$. On the other hand, if $rP' \cup rNE'$ holds, it is because the set $G$ of guesses for $s'(\rho)$ in Algorithm 2 on input samples $S'$ has at least one element, hence, this element will also be a guess for $Tr(s(\alpha))$ in Algorithm 3 on input samples $S$ and hence $rP \cup rNE$ will also hold. Henceforth

$$rP \cup rNE = rP' \cup rNE' \text{ and } rNP = rNP'.$$

On the other hand, as we have pointed out in Remark 3.7, we have that $E_q \subseteq E'_q$.

Further, if $E'_q$ holds then, given $s \in \mathbb{F}_q$, by using Lemma 2.2, the elements $b'_i(\rho) - sa'_i(\rho)$ are uniformly taken on $\mathbb{F}_q$. This fact implies that the input samples for Algorithm 3 cannot come from the PLWE distribution: Otherwise, if $(a_i(x), b(x) = a_i(x)s(x) + e_i(x))$ is a PLWE sample for Algorithm 3, with $e_i(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{p^n-1(p-1)-1} e_{ij} x^j$, then the terms $e_{ij}$ are taken from an $\mathbb{F}_q$-valued Gaussian $N(0, \sigma)$ and so are taken, in particular, those of the form $e_{jp^n-2}$. Hence for $s = Tr(s(\alpha))$ we have

$$\frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(b(\alpha)) - \frac{1}{p^{n-2}} Tr(a(\alpha))s = b'(\rho) - sa'(\rho) = \sum_{j=0}^{p(p-1)-1} e_{jp^n-2} \rho^j,$$

which is a contradiction. Hence the input samples $S$ for Algorithm 3 should be uniform and $E_q = E'_q$. 
Hence
\[ E_q \cap (rP \cup rNE) = E'_q \cap (rP' \cup rNE') \] and
\[ E_q \cap rNP = E'_q \cap rNP'. \]
Hence if the algorithm returns **NOT PLWE** then
\[ P[E_q | rNP] = \frac{P[E_q \cap rNP]}{P[rNP]} = \frac{P[E'_q \cap rNP']}{P[rNP']} = P[E'_q | rNP'] . \]

On the other hand, if the algorithm returns anything else than **NOT PLWE**, then:
\[ P[E_q | rP \cup rNE] = \frac{P[E_q \cap (rP \cup rNE)]}{P[rP \cup rNE]} = \frac{P[E'_q \cap (rP' \cup rNE')]}{P[rP' \cup rNE']} = \frac{P[E'_q | rP' \cup rNE']}{P[rP' \cup rNE']} , \]
which equals \(|\Sigma|/q)^M\) due to Proposition 3.1.

As pointed out in the introduction, suppose that there existed a surjective ring homomorphism \( t : R_q \rightarrow R_{q,0} \) such that \( t \circ N(0,\sigma) = N^*(0,\sigma^*) \) where \( N(0,\sigma) \) is a centred discrete \( R_q \)-valued Gaussian distribution of parameter \( \sigma \) and \( N^*(0,\sigma^*) \) is a centred discrete \( R_{q,0} \)-valued Gaussian distribution of parameter \( \sigma^* \). Since \( t \) would be in particular a linear map, then for each \( a^*(x) \in R_{q,0} \), there would be exactly \(|Ker(t)|\) many preimages of \( a^*(x) \), hence the induced map \( t : R^2_q \rightarrow R^2_{q,0} \) would take the uniform distribution over \( R^2_q \) to the uniform distribution over \( R^2_{q,0} \). Likewise, and up to multiplication by a scalar, it would take the PLWE distribution to the \( R_{q,0} \times R_q \)-PLWE distribution, hence reducing the PLWE to the \( R_{q,0} \)-PLWE. However, it is not clear at all for which rings (if any) such a map \( t \) exists.

### 4 Coding examples

To conclude our study, we provide numerical simulations of Algorithm 3 for some specific sets of parameters. Our code has been developed with Maple 10 and is available at GitHub\(^1\). We have made no attempt at optimising our code, in particular, it does not implement the automorphic evaluation of polynomials. This being said, we must point out that the execution time is remarkably short, even in comparison with the time necessary to obtain the sets of samples, for the parameters shown in Table 4.

\(^1\)https://github.com/raul-duran-diaz/PLWE-TraceAttack
4.1 Understanding our code

Some remarks are in order to help understand our code: to begin with, we have not simulated genuine discrete Gaussian distributions, which is a non-trivial problem but not entirely relevant when no high statistical accuracy is sought after, as in most R/PLWE literature. Instead, we have discretised the regular Gaussian distribution provided by Maple, using it as a black box. As for uniform distributions, we made use of Maple’s random sampler \texttt{rand}, adjusted to produce $\mathbb{F}_q$-samples.

Moreover, running each example, i.e., each Maple sheet, only requires choosing the desired parameters in the “main section” and executing the sheet from the beginning to the end. Notations for the Maple sheets follow closely those in the present work in order to facilitate the reading and comprehension.

4.2 Execution steps

The execution consists of the following steps:

1. Initialising the uniform distribution (\texttt{rollq}) and the discrete Gaussian (\texttt{X}).
2. Obtaining a prime of the desired size meeting the hypotheses for Theorem 2.10 to hold.
3. Obtaining the cyclotomic polynomial and its roots on an algebraic extension, and assigning any one of them to the variable \texttt{rho}.
4. Obtaining the smallness region \(\Sigma\) for the input parameters.
5. Selecting a number of executions (variable \texttt{ntests}) for Algorithm 3, and a number of samples per execution (variable \texttt{M}). Once these values have been assigned:
   (a) First, a loop is executed \texttt{ntests} times and, for each turn, \texttt{M} samples from the PLWE oracle are generated, and passed to Algorithm 3. If it outputs anything different from a set containing just one element, the execution is counted as a failure.
   (b) Second, another loop is executed, but this time producing the samples from the uniform oracle, and passing each set of samples to Algorithm 3. If it outputs anything different than an empty set, the execution is counted as a failure.

4.3 Two execution examples

Table 4 shows the sets of parameters used for running two examples, and Table 5 presents a secondary set of parameters, depending on the selected ones in Table 4.
Trace-based cryptanalysis of cyclotomic $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-PLWE for the non-split case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Example 1</th>
<th>Example 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q$</td>
<td>24029</td>
<td>40013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma$</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n_{tests}$</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Parameter selection for Examples 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent param</th>
<th>Example 1</th>
<th>Example 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polynomial $\Phi$</td>
<td>$x^{512} + 1$</td>
<td>$x^{1024} + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>2048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>1024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors of $\Phi$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$</td>
<td>$(x^{256} + 11937)(x^{256} + 12092)$</td>
<td>$(x^{512} + 27481)(x^{512} + 12532)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>$-11937$</td>
<td>$-27481$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Dependent parameters for Examples 1 and 2

4.4 Conclusions on the numerical results

To finish this section, several conclusions can be drawn.

- First of all, it is interesting to remark that, regarding running times, the most time consuming part is the process of sampling generation. For Example 2, our hardware platform (Virtual Box configured with 1 GB of main memory running over Intel CORE i5, @2.2 GHz) needs about 200 seconds to generate a set of 10 samples of any kind, but just about 1 second for running Algorithm 3 over that set. In any case, the attack is clearly feasible within very modest resource requirements.

- In the second place, but of much more interest, is the fact that execution succeeds smoothly both for the PLWE and the uniform oracles, and this happens for the two examples. This is in perfect agreement with the results predicted by the theory, thus giving strong support to the effectiveness of the decision attack presented in this work.

Acknowledgements

I. Blanco-Chacón is partially supported by the Spanish National Research Plan, grant no MTM2016-79400-P, by grant PID2019-104855RB100, funded by MCIN / AEI / 10.13039 / 501100011033 and by the University of Alcalá grant CCG20/IA-057. R. Durán-Díaz is partially supported by grant P2QProMeTe (PID2020-112586RB-I00), funded by MCIN / AEI / 10.13039 / 501100011033. R.Y. Njah Nchiwo is supported by a PhD scholarship from the Magnus Ehrnrooth Foundation, Finland, in part by Academy of Finland, grant 351271.
(PI: C. Hollanti) and in part by MATINE Finnish Ministry of Defence, grant #2500M-0147 (PI: C. Hollanti). B. Barbero-Lucas is partially supported by the University of Alcalá grant CCG20/IA-057.

References


Trace-based cryptanalysis of cyclotomic $R_{q,0} \times R_q$-PLWE for the non-split case


Received: April 4, 2023
Accepted for publication: June 26, 2023
Communicated by: Camilla Hollanti and Lenny Fukshansky